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It remains controversial whether visual awareness is correlated with early activation
indicated by VAN (visual awareness negativity), as the recurrent process hypothesis
theory proposes, or with later activation indicated by P3 or LP (late positive), as
suggested by global workspace theories. To address this issue, a backward masking
task was adopted, in which participants were first asked to categorize natural scenes of
color photographs and line-drawings and then to rate the clarity of their visual experience
on a Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). The interstimulus interval between the scene
and the mask was manipulated. The behavioral results showed that categorization
accuracy increased with PAS ratings for both color photographs and line-drawings, with
no difference in accuracy between the two types of images for each rating, indicating
that the experience rating reflected visibility. Importantly, the event-related potential
(ERP) results revealed that for correct trials, the early posterior N1 and anterior P2
components changed with the PAS ratings for color photographs, but did not vary
with the PAS ratings for line-drawings, indicating that the N1 and P2 do not always
correlate with subjective visual awareness. Moreover, for both types of images, the
anterior N2 and posterior VAN changed with the PAS ratings in a linear way, while the LP
changed with the PAS ratings in a non-linear way, suggesting that these components
relate to different types of subjective awareness. The results reconcile the apparently
contradictory predictions of different theories and help to resolve the current debate on
neural correlates of visual awareness.
Keywords: visual awareness, subjective measures, objective measures, natural scene categorization, Perceptual
Awareness Scale (PAS)
INTRODUCTION
Recently, an increasing amount of attention has been given to neural correlates of visual awareness,
i.e., the subjective experience of seeing. Neural imaging studies have revealed that a distributed
system, including the primary visual cortex (V1), V2, temporal, parietal, and frontal areas, plays
a crucial role in the generation of visual awareness (see Koch et al., 2016 for a review; Rees, 2001;
Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Salminen-Vaparanta et al., 2012). Electrophysiological studies have shown
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that an early positive enhancement (P1) over occipital regions
that were approximately 100 ms from the stimulus onset, a
negative difference wave (visual awareness negativity, VAN) at
the posterior regions typically occurring 150–250 ms from the
stimulus onset, and a P3 or a late positive (LP) wave occurring
300 ms from the stimulus onset were probably correlated with the
emergence of visual awareness (see Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010;
Revonsuo and Koivisto, 2010; Naccache et al., 2016; contrast
Silverstein et al., 2015). However, there is no agreement on what
the identity of the neural indicator is for the emergence of visual
awareness. For example, the N1 component (e.g., Jiang et al.,
2013), the P2 component (e.g., Melloni et al., 2011), and the N2
component (e.g., Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2003) have been also
argued to be related to visual awareness. The identity of the neural
indicator for the emergence of visual awareness is still unclear.
One of the challenges of addressing this issue is the
measurement of the status of visual awareness. There are
two measures of awareness or consciousness in the literature:
objective and subjective measures. With objective measures,
the ability to discriminate features of the world is taken to
indicate whether knowledge is conscious (Fu et al., 2008; Koivisto
et al., 2008). An inability to discriminate reflects the absence of
conscious knowledge. Using objective measures, P1 and VAN
might be found to be related to visual awareness. For example,
in a two-alternative matching to sample task, participants were
asked to determine whether a briefly presented “sample word”
was the same or different from a second “test word” by pressing
one of two keys. Melloni et al. (2007) found that a P1-
like component was significantly different between visible and
invisible words, indicating that the P1 component was the earliest
event-related potential (ERP) component that correlated with
visual awareness. Pins and Ffytche (2003) also found a P1 effect
for visual awareness, but this P1 correlate was not been observed
in other studies (e.g., Sergent et al., 2005; Koivisto et al., 2008;
Melloni et al., 2011). Moreover, Koivisto et al. (2008) compared
the neural activities for hit trials (aware) with those for miss
trials (unaware) and found that the posterior VAN was an earlier
ERP correlate of visual awareness. The posterior VAN correlate
has been observed in other studies (e.g., Koivisto and Revonsuo,
2003; Genetti et al., 2009).
With subjective measures, the ability to report or discriminate
mental states is taken to indicate whether the knowledge is
conscious (Fu et al., 2008; Lamy et al., 2009). If a person says
he does not see or he has no experience of the stimulus, the
knowledge revealed in the behavioral forced-choice response
is unconscious by these measures. Using subjective measures,
P3 or LP might be found to be related to visual awareness.
For example, Lamy et al. (2009) compared the neural activities
for correct trials in which participants reported they had
seen the stimulus (aware-correct) and correct trials in which
participants reported that they merely guessed (unaware-
correct). They found that only an enhanced P3 effect with
a widely distributed topography was related to subjective
awareness. Similarly, Del Cul et al. (2007) also found that only
the P3 amplitude distinguished visible and invisible stimuli
in subjective reports. Moreover, although the studies using
objective measures found VAN to be related to visual awareness,
most of them also found P3 or LP (later positive) effects
in visual awareness (e.g., Koivisto et al., 2008; Genetti et al.,
2009).
Obviously, different measures lead to different findings in
the neural correlates of visual awareness, but more importantly,
they are based on different theories of consciousness. For
example, subjective measures are consistent with the assumption
of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory that states that
a distinguishable characteristic of a conscious state is that
an individual can report the state (Rosenthal, 2005; Lau
and Rosenthal, 2011). According to the HOT theory, the
conscious status of a mental state is most naturally measured
by subjective measures. Meanwhile, the global workspace (GWS)
theory takes the dynamic long-distance synchronization as a
key feature for conscious condition (Dehaene and Naccache,
2001). According to the GWS theory, objective measures
could be satisfied by local processors without information
entering the workspace. Information in the workspace would
be available to higher order thoughts, so the GWS theory
naturally motivates subjective measures. In this respect, the
HOT and GWS theory are similar. In contrast, a recent
recurrent processing hypothesis states that localized recurrent
processing is sufficient for consciousness, and while not entirely
obvious theoretically, this approach has been used to motivate
objective measures (Lamme, 2010). But most generally, the
local recurrent processing approach attempts to move away
from behavioral or introspective methods in the measure of
consciousness.
The widely distributed P3 or LP correlate of visual awareness
is in line with the prediction of the GWS theory, which assumes
that visual awareness correlates with later activation in the fronto-
parietal cortices; the more local posterior VAN correlate of visual
awareness is in line with the recurrent processing hypothesis,
which proposes that visual awareness correlates with early
activation in the visual cortex (Windey et al., 2013; Andersen
et al., 2015; Koivisto and Grassini, 2016). In addition, the GWS
theory assumes that visual awareness is dichotomous, while the
recurrent processing hypothesis assumes that visual awareness
is graded (Windey et al., 2013; Andersen et al., 2015; Koivisto
and Grassini, 2016). It remains controversial whether visual
awareness is correlated with early activation indicated by VAN,
as the recurrent process hypothesis theory proposes, or with later
activation indicated by P3 or LP, as suggested by the GWS and
HOT theories, and whether the neural indicator is correlated with
visual awareness in a dichotomous or graded way.
Interestingly, Timmermans et al. (2010) argued that studies
supporting the GWS theory generally use complex stimuli (e.g.,
Del Cul et al., 2007, 2009), whereas studies supporting the
recurrent processing hypothesis mostly use simple stimuli (e.g.,
Fahrenfort et al., 2007). Moreover, Windey et al. (2013) found
that simple task produced evidence for graded visual awareness,
whereas more complex task produced more dichotomous visual
awareness. Thus, the findings about the neural correlates of visual
awareness could be influenced by stimulus or task complexity.
To the best of our knowledge, no study has adopted complex
stimuli such as natural scenes to explore neural correlates of
visual awareness. Natural scenes are rather complex, but people
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can categorize them quickly and accurately, even with little or no
attention (Li et al., 2002; Rousselet et al., 2002; Feifei et al., 2005;
Otsuka and Kawaguchi, 2007), and it has been claimed that the
integration of scene elements can be achieved without awareness
(Mudrik et al., 2011; Mudrik and Koch, 2013), although there
is inconsistent evidence for this (Faivre and Koch, 2014; Moors
et al., 2016). Moreover, recently, a fMRI study found that natural
scene categorization of line-drawings generated similar neural
activation as color photographs, although color photographs
includes more features such as color and contexts than line-
drawings (Walther et al., 2011).
Therefore, to further examine what are the neural correlates
of visual awareness, we adopted natural scenes of both color
photographs and line-drawings in a backward masking task.
In the backward masking task, the stimulus duration was
identical, i.e., the physical stimulus was identical, and the
interstimulus interval (ISI) between the stimulus and the mask
was manipulated. It has been demonstrated that masking has
little effect on the feedforward processing of a stimulus from
low to high visual areas, but interferes with the recurrent
processing of the stimulus from high to low visual areas that
is crucial for the emergence of visual awareness (Rolls et al.,
1999; Lamme et al., 2002; Lamme, 2010). To measure the
status of visual awareness, we used subjective measures because
they are motivated by two major psychological approaches
to consciousness, that is, higher order and GWS approaches.
Specifically, we used the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS),
in which participants were asked to rate the clarity of their
visual experience using a 4-point scale with the elements: no
experience, brief glimpse, almost clear image, and clear image
(Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Sandberg et al., 2010; see also
Dienes and Seth, 2010). The interpretation of PAS depends on
its theoretical relation to awareness of the relevant stimulus
characteristics. On one view, each PAS rating represents an
increase in visual awareness in a graded way (e.g., Ramsøy and
Overgaard, 2004). On another view, the distinction between, on
the one hand, brief glimpse, in which the subject claims not
to have seen anything of relevance, and almost clear image,
on the other hand, marks a distinct change in the conscious
awareness of information relevant to the task discrimination
(Dienes and Seth, 2010). On the first view, a correlate of
awareness should vary linearly with the PAS ratings; on the
second view, relevant components should vary non-linearly with
the PAS ratings. Further, if subjective visual awareness correlates
with early activation in the visual cortex, the posterior VAN
should vary with the PAS ratings in an appropriate way; or
else, if long-distance activation among brain areas is additionally
required for the emergence of subjective awareness, a widely
distributed P3 or LP would vary with the PAS ratings in an
appropriate way.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-two college students (11 males and 11 females; mean
age= 21.82 years, SD= 2.34 years) participated in this study. All
of them had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and none of
them had any history of neurological or psychiatric diseases. This
experiment was approved by the committee for the protection
of subjects at the Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of
Sciences. All students gave written informed consent and were
paid for their attendance.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimuli were images of six natural scene categories: beaches,
city streets, forests, highways, mountains, and offices (see
Figure 1). Each image had a resolution of 320 pixels× 240 pixels
in two versions: color photographs and line-drawings. The line-
drawings were produced by trained artists by tracing contours in
the color photographs (see Walther et al., 2011). Each category
had 76 to 80 different images, for a total of 475. The masks
were two white noise images at two different spatial scales: one
was generated at the resolutions of 320/240, and the other was
generated at the resolutions of 20/15 and then resized to 320/240
pixels. Each mask was also resized to 320 pixels × 240 pixels in
two versions: one was in color and the other was in grayscale.
The stimulus was presented against a silver gray background on
a CRT monitor with a resolution of 1280 pixels × 768 pixels
and a refresh rate of 75 Hz. The distance from the participants
to the screen was approximately 60 cm, and the horizontal and
vertical visual angles were approximately 8.7 and 8.2 degrees,
respectively.
Procedure
Each trial began with a black fixation cross at the center of
the screen for 500–950 ms at random. Then, an image was
presented for 13 ms, and followed by two masks for 100 ms.
Each mask was shown for 50 ms and the sequence of the two
masks was randomly assigned. For color photographs, the masks
were in color, and for line-drawings, the masks were in grayscale.
The ISI between the image and the mask was 0, 13, 26, or
200 ms at random. After the masks, a blank was presented for
500 ms and then six category names appeared on the screen
from left to right. Participants were asked to report the category
of the presented image by pressing a corresponding key on the
keyboard. The keys D, F, G, H, J, and K corresponded to the
locations of the six category names. To prevent participants
from preparing for their response before the appearance of
the category names, the locations of the six category names
were randomly assigned for each trial. There was no feedback
about the response. After the response, they were asked to
rate their experience of the stimulus, i.e., how clearly did they
see the image, with four possible options from left to right
on the PAS scale [(1) no experience; (2) brief glimpse; (3)
almost clear experience; (4) clear experience] by pressing a
corresponding key. Participants were told to select the option
according to their true feelings and then to press the space
key to start the next trial when they were ready. There were
approximately 95 trials in each block, in which type of image
(color photographs vs. line-drawings), natural scene category,
and ISI were counterbalanced. There were at least 30 s of rest
between any two blocks. The experiment included 10 blocks, for
a total of 950 trials.
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of six natural scene categories of color photographs and line-drawings.
EEG Recording and Analysis
Electroencephalograph (EEG) was recorded with a NeuroScan
Synamps amplifier using a custom 64-channel cap. The left
mastoid was used as an on-line reference and the algebraic
average of left and right mastoids was used as off-line re-
reference. Two pairs of electrodes placed 1 cm above and below
one eye and 1 cm lateral from the outer canthi of both eyes
were used to monitor blinks and other eye movements. The EEG
signals were amplified by using a band pass of 0.05 to100 Hz,
with a sampling rate of 500 Hz. Electrode impedances were
kept below 5 k. For the analysis of ERPs, the continuous EEG
signals were low pass filtered, with a cutoff frequency at 30 Hz,
and then segmented in series of epochs of 800 ms. Each epoch
started 100 ms before the stimulus onset. Baseline correction
was performed over the 100 ms window before the stimulus
presentation. Trials containing voltages exceeding± 80 µV were
rejected. The average rejection rate was only 2.17%.
ERPs for correct trials were averaged separately for the
different experience ratings of color photographs and line-
drawings. Based on previous studies (for review, see Koivisto and
Revonsuo, 2010; Melloni et al., 2011), the mean amplitudes of the
ERPs were analyzed for P1 (100–130 ms), N1 (140–200 ms), P2
(150–190 ms), N2 (210–310 ms), VAN (240–300 ms), P3a (370–
470 ms), and LP or P3 (420–570 ms). The time windows for the
statistical analysis of the ERPs were determined on the basis of
the grand average waves. The mean amplitudes were computed
over groups of electrodes representative of the topography of each
component. For P1, N1, and VAN, a group of occipital electrodes
(CB1, O1, Oz, O2, and CB2) was selected; for P2, N2, and P3a,
a group of fronto-central electrodes (F3, Fz, F4, FC3, FCz, FC4,
C3, Cz, and C4) was selected; for LP, a group of occipito-parietal
electrodes (P3, Pz, P4, PO3, POz, PO4, O1, Oz, and O2) was
selected. Each was subjected to repeated two-way ANOVA with
the type of image (color photographs vs. line-drawings) and
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experience ratings (no experience vs. brief glimpse vs. almost
clear experience vs. clear experience) as within-subject variables.
RESULTS
Inferential Strategy
For all tests p-values are reported; in addition, for all one degree
of freedom tests, Bayes factors, B, are reported. Bayes factors (B)
were used to assess strength of evidence for H1 relative to H0
(Wagenmakers et al., 2015). Unlike null-hypothesis significance
testing, Bayes factors have the advantage of distinguishing
sensitive evidence for H0 from not much evidence at all (relative
to the range of effects that could plausibly be obtained on H1).
A B of above 3 indicates evidence for the alternative hypothesis
and below 1/3 evidence for the null hypothesis. Bs between 3 and
1/3 indicate data insensitivity in distinguishing H0 and H1 (see
Dienes, 2014; cf Jeffreys, 1939). Thus we will report that there was
no effect only when B < 1/3, that is, when there is evidence for
H0 over H1. Here, BN(0,x) refers to a Bayes factor in which the
predictions of H1 were modeled as normal distribution with an
SD of x (see Dienes, 2014), where x scales the size of effect that
could be expected. If a rough maximum effect can be determined,
x can be set as half that value (Dienes, 2014).
For proportions of different PAS ratings, with four ratings
the average proportion was 0.25, so we report BN(0,0.25). For
accuracy of classification, as the range from baseline (i.e.,
chance level 0.17) to 1 was 0.83, a difference of 0.83 is the
maximum difference that could be expected between any two
conditions. Thus, we took half of 0.83 as the SD and report
BN(0,0.42). For ERP results, we took half of the roughly average
difference between maximal and minimal amplitude of the ERP
component over color photographs and line-drawings as x for
each component. Note that the difference between maximal and
minimal amplitude was never itself tested, so there is no double
counting (Jeffreys, 1939). As positive trend coefficients summed
to 1 and negative to −1, the expected size of linear trends is the
same as a simple difference. Thus, for trend contrasts, H1 was
modeled as a normal with an SD equal to half of the roughly
average difference between maximal and minimal amplitudes
of the ERP component, as just mentioned. With these models
of H1, it so happened that whenever p < 0.05, then B > 3,
and vice versa. There is no guarantee of this correspondence
(Lindley, 1957), but in the current case significance testing and
Bayesian analyses agreed when indicating that there was an
effect.
Behavioral Results
As in previous studies (e.g., Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Del
Cul et al., 2007; Railo et al., 2015), we treated the experience
rating as a within-subject factor. Figure 2 shows the proportion
and accuracy for each experience rating for both types of images.
Repeated ANOVA on proportions, with experience ratings and
type of image as within-subject variables, revealed a significant
effect of experience ratings, F(1.62,33.97) = 4.34, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.17, and a significant experience ratings by type of image
interaction, F(3,63) = 22.55, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.52. People
reported having a “brief glimpse” less often for color photographs
than for line-drawings, t(21) = −7.37, p < 0.001, dz = 1.61,
BN(0,0.25) = 7.13× 1010; but reported having a “clear experience”
more often for color photographs than for line-drawings,
t(21) = 6.69, p < 0.001, dz = 1.46, BN(0,0.25) = 9.07 × 108.
There were no differences between color photographs and line-
drawings in the proportion of time they reported having “no
experience,” t(21)=−0.03, p= 0.98, BN(0,0.25) = 0.08, nor in the
proportion of “almost clear experience” reports, t(21) = −1.43,
p = 0.17, BN(0,0.25) = 0.32. Overall, the above results provided
substantial evidence that people had subjective experiences with
more felt clarity of color photographs than of line-drawings.
Repeated ANOVA on accuracy, with experience ratings and
type of image as within-subject variables, revealed only a
significant effect of experience ratings, F(1.83,38.86) = 299.49,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.93. For both types of images, the accuracy
was higher for a “clear image” than for an “almost clear image,”
t(21) = 4.81, p < 0.001, dz = 1.05, BN(0,0.42) = 3.66 × 1020,
higher for an “almost clear image” than for a “brief glimpse,”
t(21) = 13.05, p < 0.001, dz = 2.85, BN(0,0.42) = 1.58 × 1035,
and higher for a “brief glimpse” than for “no experience,”
t(21) = 9.90, p < 0.001, dz = 2.16, BN(0,0.42) = 1.47 × 104.
There was no effect of type of image, F(1,21) = 0.09, p = 0.77,
η2p = 0.004, BN(0,0.42) = 0.04. The two-way interaction did not
reach significance, F(3,63) = 2.17, p = 0.10, η2p = 0.09. For
both color photographs and line-drawings, the accuracy was
above chance (0.17) for “no experience,” t(21) = 4.11, p < 0.001,
dz = 0.88, BN(0,0.42) = 2.85 × 1058, t(21) = 3.56, p < 0.01,
dz= 0.76, BN(0,0.42) = 3.51× 1026. That is, people could correctly
classify natural scenes even when they reported that they did not
see them at all.
ERP Results
Inspection of ERPs revealed seven major components: P1, N1,
P2, N2, VAN, P3a, and LP (or P3). Figure 3 shows the ERP
data for each condition. Figure 4 shows the mean amplitudes
of each component for each condition. To evaluate which
components were correlated with subjective awareness, repeated
two-way ANOVA with experience ratings (no experience vs.
brief glimpse vs. almost clear experience vs. clear experience)
and type of images (color photographs vs. line-drawings) as
within-subject variables was conducted for the mean amplitude
of each component. Moreover, as “brief glimpse” involves some
visual experience, but not of anything relevant to making
the task discrimination, the difference between “brief glimpse”
and “almost clear image” is when perceptual contents go
from largely unconscious and to largely conscious. Even on
a graded consciousness view (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004),
this particular contrast represents a distinction in amount of
conscious awareness. Thus, to further examine whether each
component was a real marker of the conscious status of
knowledge of a stimulus, the planned comparison between “brief
glimpse” and “almost clear image” were conducted for the mean
amplitude of each component.
Table 1 summarizes significant results of the ANOVAs. As
observed from Table 1, for posterior P1 amplitudes, the effect of
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FIGURE 2 | Proportions and accuracies of each experience rating for each type of image. (A) Proportions of each experience rating for each type of image.
(B) Accuracies of each experience rating for each type of image. Error bars depict standard errors. Note that 1 refers to “no experience,” 2 refers to “brief glimpse,” 3
refers to “almost clear experience,” and 4 refers to “clear experience” on the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS).
the experience ratings and interaction did not reach significance
(ps > 0.31). The planned comparison revealed that there was
evidence for no difference between “brief glimpse” and “almost
clear experience” for color photographs, t(21)=−1.24, p= 0.23,
dz = 0.26, BN(0,3) = 0.26, and marginal evidence that there was
no difference for line-drawings, t(21)= 1.46, p= 0.16, dz = 0.31,
BN(0,3) = 0.35. That is, the posterior P1 amplitude did not always
relate to subjective awareness.
For posterior N1 and anterior P2 amplitudes, the two-
way ANOVAs revealed significant experience rating effects
which were modulated by the type of image. Further analysis
revealed that for color photographs only, the amplitudes of
posterior N1 and anterior P2 significantly varied with visual
awareness, F(1.86,39.08) = 23.02, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.52,
F(2.09,43.81) = 10.54, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.33, but did
not for line-drawings (ps > 0.12). For N1, the planned
comparison revealed that “brief glimpse” differed from “almost
clear experience” for color photographs, t(21) = −5.85,
p < 0.001, dz = 1.25, BN(0,3) = 4.46 × 106, but not for line-
drawings, t(21) = −0.81, p = 0.43, dz = 0.17, BN(0,3) = 0.18.
For P2, the planned comparison revealed that there was
no evidence for whether or not “brief glimpse” differed
from “almost clear experience” for color photographs,
t(21) = 1.14, p = 0.27, dz = 0.24, BN(0,4) = 0.47, but there
was substantial evidence for no difference for line-drawings,
t(21) = −0.07, p = 0.94, dz = 0.01, BN(0,4) = 0.08. Thus,
the results indicated that the posterior N1 and anterior
P2 amplitudes did not always correlate with subjective
awareness.
For the later components N2, VAN, P3a, and LP, the two-
way ANOVAs revealed significant experience rating effects
(all ps < 0.01), which were not significantly influenced by
the type of images (all ps > 0.19). For N2, the planned
comparison revealed that “brief glimpse” differed from “almost
clear experience” for both color photographs, t(21) = −4.03,
p = 0.001, dz = 0.86, BN(0,4) = 8.20 × 102, and line-drawings,
t(21) = −3.42, p < 0.01, dz = 0.73, BN(0,4) = 69.39. For
VAN, “brief glimpse” differed from “almost clear experience”
for both color photographs, t(21) = 3.12, p < 0.01, dz = 0.67,
BN(0,4) = 23.89, and line-drawings, t(21) = 4.06, p < 0.001,
dz = 0.87, BN(0,4) = 2.35 × 103. However, for P3a, there was
not much evidence for the difference between “brief glimpse” and
“almost clear experience” either way for either color photographs,
t(21) = 0.84, p = 0.41, dz = 0.18, BN(0,4) = 0.35, or line-
drawings, t(21) = 1.08, p = 0.29, dz = 0.23, BN(0,4) = 2.59.
Finally, for LP, there was a difference between “brief glimpse”
and “almost clear experience” for both color photographs,
t(21) = 3.95, p = 0.001, dz = 0.84, BN(0,3) = 6.60 × 102,
and line-drawings, t(21) = 2.11, p < 0.05, dz = 0.45,
BN(0,3) = 3.24. That is, the results suggested that the N2, VAN,
and LP amplitudes could be related to the emergence of subjective
awareness, while the evidence for P3a amplitude marking a
change in subjective awareness was insensitive.
To further examine how the later components correlated
with the subjective awareness, we used “no experience,” “brief
glimpse,” and “almost clear experience” to calculate the linear
trend coefficient for each of the later component (i.e., the
difference between the first and last ratings). For N2, the linear
trend coefficients were above zero for both color photographs
and line-drawings, t(21) = 5.81, p < 0.001, dz = 1.24,
BN(0,2) = 3.84 × 105, t(21) = 3.16, p < 0.01, dz = 0.67,
BN(0,2) = 27.03. For VAN, the linear trend coefficients were
below zero for both types of images, t(21) = −4.16, p < 0.001,
dz = 0.89, BN(0,2) = 1.13 × 103, t(21) = −3.70, p = 0.001,
dz = 0.79, BN(0,2) = 3.815 × 102. For LP, there was not
much evidence either way for whether or not the linear
trend coefficients were different from zero for both types of
images, t(21) = 1.64, p = 0.12, dz = 0.35, BN(0,2) = 2.56,
t(21) = 1.31, p = 0.20, dz = 0.28, BN(0,2) = 1.58. Moreover,
for N2, “no experience” differed from “brief glimpse” for both
color photographs, t(21) = −2.80, p < 0.05, dz = 0.60,
BN(0,4) = 15.88, and line-drawings, t(21) = −2.13, p < 0.05,
dz = 0.45, BN(0,4) = 5.14. For VAN, “no experience” also differed
from “brief glimpse” for both color photographs, t(21) = 3.90,
p = 0.001, dz = 0.83, BN(0,3) = 5.84 × 102, and line-drawings:
t(21)= 2.43, p< 0.05, dz = 0.52, BN(0,3) = 6.08. But for LP, there
was marginal evidence for no difference between “no experience”
and “brief glimpse” for color photographs, t(21)= 0.80, p= 0.43,
dz = 0.17, BN(0,3) = 0.37, and evidence for no difference
between “no experience” and “brief glimpse” for line-drawings,
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FIGURE 3 | Grand-average ERPs for each experience rating for color photographs and line-drawings. (A) Grand-average ERPs of correct trials at
electrodes FCz, Pz, and Oz for each experience rating for color photographs and line-drawings. (B) ERP differences between every two adjacent experience ratings
for color photographs and line-drawings. (C) The scalp topography of the P1, N1, P2, N2, VAN, P3a, and LP, trials of the relatively higher experience ratings minus
trials of the adjacent lower experience ratings separately for color photographs and line-drawings.
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FIGURE 4 | Mean amplitudes of each component on experience rating for color photographs and line-drawings. Error bars depict standard errors. Note
that 1 refers to “no experience,” 2 refers to “brief glimpse,” 3 refers to “almost clear experience,” and 4 refers to “clear experience” on the PAS.
TABLE 1 | Significant results of the two-way repeated ANOVAs performed over the amplitude of each component, considering experience ratings and
type of images.
Experience ratings Type of image Experience ratings by type of image
F η2p F η
2
p F η
2
p
Posterior P1 38.49∗∗∗ 0.65
Posterior N1 25.65∗∗∗ 0.55 5.54∗ 0.21 7.74∗∗∗ 0.27
Anterior P2 5.21∗∗ 0.20 6.62∗∗ 0.24
N2 27.04∗∗∗ 0.56
VAN 27.74∗∗∗ 0.57 25.14∗∗∗ 0.55
P3a 11.13∗∗ 0.35 6.20∗∗ 0.23
LP 14.68∗∗∗ 0.41 5.93∗∗ 0.22
In each ANOVA, we report F-values with significance and η2p.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
t(21) = 0.26, p = 0.80, dz = 0.06, BN(0,3) = 0.22. The results
suggested that the N2 and VAN could be related to PAS in a
linear way, whereas the LP correlated with PAS in a non-linear
fashion.
To explore the relationship between experience ratings and
ERPs controlling for ISIs, we firstly described the distribution
of ISIs cross correct trials for each experience rating for color
photographs and line-drawings (see Figure 5). As can be seen
from Figure 5, the number of correct trials for some ISI
and experience rating combinations was rather small. As ERP
effects usually require a large number of trials to measure them
accurately in each condition (Luck, 2005, p. 23), “no experience”
and “brief glimpse” were collapsed to form an “unconscious”
category, while “almost clear experience” and “clear experience”
were collapsed together for a “conscious” category, as per Melloni
et al. (2011). The data from three participants were excluded
because the number of trials for at least one condition was
zero for them. Figure 6 shows the ERP data for conscious
and unconscious categories of each ISI for color photographs
and line-drawings. An ANOVA with type of image (color
photographs vs. line-drawings), experience ratings (unconscious
vs. conscious), and ISI (0, 13, 26, and 200 ms) was conducted
separately for amplitudes of N2, VAN, and LP. For N2, there was
an experience rating effect, F(1,18)= 28.91, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.62,
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FIGURE 5 | Interstimulus interval distributions across correct trials for each experience ratings. (A) ISI distributions across correct trials for each
experience ratings for color photographs. (B) ISI distributions across correct trials for each experience ratings for line-drawings. Error bars depict standard errors.
BN(0,4) = 2.15 × 105, a significant ISI effect, F(3,54) = 20.39,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.53. For VAN, there was a type of image effect,
F(1,18) = 26.89, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.60, BN(0,4) = 8.68 × 104,
a significant ISI effect, F(1.65,29.63) = 37.53, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.68, and a significant type of image by ISI interaction,
F(2.34,42.20) = 8.71, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.33. For LP, there was
a type of image effect, F(1,18) = 7.50, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.29,
BN(0,3) = 8.30, an experience rating effect, F(1,18) = 17.67,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.50, BN(0,3) = 9.03 × 102, and a significant
ISI effect, F(2.21,39.69) = 26.12, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.59. The main
effect of experience ratings on amplitudes indicated that the N2
and LP were each related to subjective awareness even controlling
for ISI.
DISCUSSION
Our behavioral results showed that people reported having more
“clear experience” but less “brief glimpse” for color photographs
than for line-drawings, suggesting that people had more
experienced clarity for color photographs than for line-drawings.
Importantly, there was no difference for accuracy between color
photographs and line-drawings for each experience rating and
the accuracy for both types of image gradually increased with
rating, consistent with the experience ratings reflecting visibility.
However, the accuracy for both types of images was above
chance for “no experience,” providing evidence for subliminal
perception with an elaborated subjective scale. This may seem
inconsistent with the finding of Ramsøy and Overgaard (2004),
in that they found the accuracy for the stimulus form was not
significantly better than chance for “no experience”. However,
a non-significant result is not in itself evidence for the null
hypothesis.
The ERP results showed that the posterior P1 amplitude
did not change with the PAS ratings, confirming previous
findings that the early P1 component is not related to
visual awareness (Del Cul et al., 2007; Koivisto et al., 2008;
Melloni et al., 2011). Further, the posterior N1 and anterior
P2 components did not vary with the PAS ratings for line-
drawings at least. The N1 amplitude for color photographs
decreased with increasing subjective ratings, consistent with
previous results showing that the N1 amplitude decreased
when visibility increased (Melloni et al., 2011). However,
as the N1 component for line-drawings did not vary with
subjective ratings, the N1 component cannot be a general
indicator of subjective awareness. Similarly, the P2 amplitude for
color photographs decreased with increasing subjective ratings,
consistent with previous findings that the P2 amplitude decreased
as visibility increased (Melloni et al., 2011). Nonetheless, as the
P2 component for line-drawings did not change with subjective
ratings, indicating that the P2 component is also not always
related to subjective awareness. It has been found that N1
and P2 are associated with feature detection or integration
(Hillyard and Münte, 1984; Luck and Hillyard, 1994). The
features were more complex in color photographs than in
line-drawings. Thus, the fact that N1 and P2 correlated with
experience ratings for color photographs rather than for line-
drawings may be because that the feature analysis varied with
the experience ratings for color photographs but not for line-
drawings.
Importantly, we found that the posterior VAN did vary
with the PAS ratings linearly for both color photographs and
line-drawings, which is consistent with previous findings that
the posterior VAN correlated with visual awareness, as the
recurrent process hypothesis theory proposes (Koivisto and
Revonsuo, 2003; Koivisto et al., 2008; Genetti et al., 2009). Indeed,
Koivisto and Revonsuo (2010) reviewed ERP studies on visual
awareness and suggested that VAN is the most consistently
observed feature across different studies. However, we found
that there were significant differences for the VAN amplitudes
between “no experience” and “brief glimpse” and between
“brief glimpse” and “almost clear experience” for both color
photographs and line-drawings. On the view that “no experience”
and “brief glimpse” can be collapsed together as reflecting lack
of conscious awareness of visual features relevant to the task
discrimination (Dienes and Seth, 2010), the VAN amplitude
increase would not be a good indicator of the emergence of
subjective awareness.
Moreover, our results showed that the anterior N2 gradually
decreased with the PAS ratings. The anterior N2 has been
observed to correlate with conscious awareness in other cognitive
tasks. For example, Eimer et al. (1996) found that the anterior
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FIGURE 6 | Grand-average ERPs of correct trials at electrodes FCz, Pz, and Oz for conscious and unconscious category of each ISI for color
photographs and line-drawings. The average number of trials for each condition was 38.01 for color photographs, and 35.43 for line-drawings. (For color
photographs, the number of trials for conscious and unconscious category of each ISI was 27.16, 20.26, 32.37, 36.95, 28.26, 54.53, 12.42, 92.16, 33.05, 17.63,
34.05, 28.79, 33.16, 39.68, 21.63, and 75.42, respectively).
N2 enhancement for deviant stimuli compared with standard
stimuli might be regarded as an indicator of the amount
of explicit (conscious) knowledge in a serial reaction task.
Schankin and Wascher (2007) also found that the anterior
N2 were smaller for detected or aware changes than for
undetected or unaware changes in Experiment 1 in a change
detection task. Nonetheless, Schankin and Wascher (2007) did
not observe the N2 effect when the influence of working
memory was eliminated in Experiment 2, and a few studies
have found that the N2 amplitudes were not significantly
affected by subjectively awareness of the targets when they
were simple lines or shapes (e.g., Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2003;
Lamy et al., 2009). As N2 is related to an actively attended
mismatch between a stimulus and a mental template (Folstein
and Van Petten, 2008), the inconsistent findings may be due
to the requirement difference on memory retrieval in different
tasks.
Unlike VAN and N2 amplitudes, the P3a and LP (or
P3) amplitudes seemed to change non-linearly with subjective
ratings. For color photographs, the P3a amplitude was not larger
for “brief glimpse” than for “almost clear experience,” suggesting
that the P3a was not sensitive to subjective awareness. As P3a
reflects top-down monitoring by frontal attention mechanisms
engaged to evaluate incoming stimuli (Polich, 2007), the P3a
amplitude might be related to evaluating difficulty more than
subjective awareness. Importantly, the LP amplitude was larger
for “almost clear experience” than for “brief glimpse,” but there
was no difference between “brief glimpse” and “no experience,”
indicating that the LP amplitude is an indicator of the emergence
of subjective awareness, assuming a non-linear relation between
PAS and relevant awareness. The results indicated that visual
awareness is correlated with later activation indicated by P3 or
LP, as suggested by the GWS and HOT theories (Koivisto et al.,
2008; Genetti et al., 2009).
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The different patterns of VAN and LP in our findings are
consistent with different stages or types of subjective awareness.
It has been noted that the perception of masked displays
might involve two stages: during the early stage, i.e., the first
200 to 300 ms from the stimulus onset, the brain responses
detectable with ERPs increase linearly with the stimulus energy
or duration, whereas in the second stage, after approximately
300 ms from the stimulus onset, the brain activity detectable
with ERPs is characterized by a non-linear relation to stimulus
magnitudes (see Kouider et al., 2013). Koivisto and Revonsuo
(2003) suggested that the VAN is an electrophysiological correlate
of phenomenal visual awareness, the subjective experience of
seeing the stimulus, whereas the later LP reflects access visual
awareness, the conscious evaluation of the stimulus for decision-
making (Block, 1995, 1996). Lamme (2010) also argued that
all the neural ingredients that seem to matter for the visual
phenomenality are present in the localized recurrent processes
(indicated by the VAN), and the widespread recurrent processes
(indicated by the LP) allow to have only reportable conscious
visual information. Therefore, the VAN may change linearly with
the quality of visual perception, which may reflect how first
order visual quality, which some may call visual phenomenal
awareness, is graded or continuous; whereas the LP varies non-
linearly with PAS, and may reflect awareness of being in a relevant
mental state (and therefore the state being conscious by higher
order and GWS theories).
Finally, we should note some limitations in the present study.
First, as different experience ratings included different proportion
of trials with same ISIs, there is an issue of the influence of
ISI on visibility. Ideally, the physical stimulation should remain
constant when compared trials with different experience ratings.
However, as a sufficient amount of responses for each experience
rating was necessary, different contrasts between the target and
the background (e.g., Andersen et al., 2015) or different stimulus
durations (e.g., Koivisto and Grassini, 2016) were often used.
In the present study, the stimulus duration was same for all
experience ratings, while the ISI between the target and the mask
was varied. Previous studies revealed that backward masking
does not influence the feed-forward processing but interrupts the
recurrent processing between high and low cortical areas which
is crucial for the emergence of visual awareness (Lamme et al.,
2002). Importantly, when “no experience” and “brief glimpse”
were collapsed to form an “unconscious” category and “almost
clear experience” and “clear experience” to form a “conscious”
category, we also found that N2 and LP were each related to
subjective awareness even controlling for ISI. However, further
studies could still usefully explore how VAN and LP vary with
experience ratings when the ISI remains unchanged so the
control is not just statistical. Second, although we attempted
to find neural correlates of subjective awareness, we could not
assume that participants always provided accurate descriptions
of their experience in their subjective reports (Dehaene and
Naccache, 2001). Fortunately, we found that there were no
significant accuracy differences between color photographs and
line-drawings for each experience rating, suggesting that the
rating was relatively accurate in the present study. Our findings
are the first to show that the VAN amplitude increased linearly
with the PAS ratings whereas the LP amplitude increased non-
linearly with PAS ratings, which is helpful to reconcile the
apparently contradictory theories and to resolve the current
debate on the neural correlates of visual awareness.
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